Abstract. Suppose that the outcomes of a roulette table are not entirely random, in the sense that there exists a strategy which achieves the accumulation of an eventually unbounded amount of capital. Is there then a successful 'monotonous' strategy, which only ever (declines to bet or) bets on red, or alternatively, only ever bets on black? Alternatively, is there a successful 'separable' strategy, in the sense that it does not use the winnings from betting on red in order to bet on black, and vice-versa? We show that the answer to these questions can be positive or negative depending on the simplicity of the strategies in question, the main two cases being the decidable strategies and the infinite mixtures of decidable strategies. More generally, we show that there are warped casino sequences, even with effective Hausdorff dimension 1/2, such that for any effective mixture of strategies (also viewed as computably enumerable strategies) which succeeds on them, it is undecidable whether more capital is placed on red or black in each round. On the other hand, every casino sequence of effective Hausdorff dimension less than 1/2 has a computably enumerable winning strategy which only bets on red or only bets on black.
Introduction
A bet in a game of chance is usually determined by two values: the chosen outcome and the wager x one bets on that outcome. If the real outcome is the same as that chosen then the player gains profit x, and otherwise she loses the wager x. Many gambling systems for repeated betting are based on elaborate choices for the wager x, while leaving the choice of outcome constant. In this work we are interested in such 'monotonous' strategies, which we also call single-sided. Consider the game of roulette, for example, and the binary outcome of red/black. 1 Perhaps the most infamous roulette system is the martingale, where one constantly bets on a fixed color, say red, starts with an initial wager x and doubles the wager after each loss. At the first winning stage all losses are then recovered and an additional profit x is achieved. Such systems rely on the fairness of the game, in the form of a law of large numbers that has to obeyed in the limit (and, of course, require unbounded initial resources in order to guarantee success with probability 1). In the example of the martingale the relevant law is that, with probability 1, there must be a round where the outcome is red. A large number of other systems have been developed that use more tame series of wagers (compared to the exponential increase of the martingale), and which appeal to various forms of the law of large numbers. 2 In the case where the casino is biased, i.e. the outcomes are not entirely random, we ought to be able to produce more successful strategies. Suppose that we bet on repeated coin-tosses, and that we are given the information that the coin has a bias. In this case it is well known that we can define an effective strategy that, independent of the bias of the coin (i.e. which side the coin is biased on, or even any lower bounds on the bias), is guaranteed to gain unbounded capital, starting from any non-zero initial capital. This strategy, as we explain in §2.5, is the mixture of two single-sided strategies, where the first one always bets on heads and the second one always bets on tails. A slightly modified strategy is successful on every coin-toss sequence X except for the case that the limit of the relative frequency of heads exists and is 1/2. In the following we refer to any binary sequence which is produced by a (potentially partially) random process, as a casino sequence.
A casino sequence may have a (more subtle) bias while satisfying several known laws of large numbers, such as the relative frequency of 0s tending to 1/2. More formally, we can say that a casino sequence X is biased if there is an 'effective' (as in 'constructive' or 'definable') betting strategy which succeeds on X, i.e. produces an unbounded capital, starting from a finite initial capital. By adopting stronger or weaker formalizations of the term 'effective' one obtains different strengths of bias, or as we usually say, nonrandomness of X. In general, 'effective' means that the strategy is definable in a simple way, such as being programmable in a Turing machine. 3 Suppose that we know that the casino sequence X has a bias in this more general sense, i.e. there exists some 'effective' betting strategy which succeeds on it. The starting point of the present article is the following question:
Is it possible to succeed on any such warped casino sequence with a single-sided 'effective' betting strategy, i.e. one that can only place bets on 0 or only on 1?
In other words, can any 'effective' betting strategy be replaced by a single-sided 'effective' betting strategy without sacrificing success? An equivalent way to ask this question is as follows.
Suppose that we are betting with the restriction that we cannot use our earnings from the successful bets on 0s in order to bet on 1s, and vice-versa. Can we win on any casinosequence X which is 'biased' in the sense that there is an (unrestricted) strategy which wins on X?
We will see that, depending on the way we formalise the term 'effective', these questions can have a positive or negative answer.
Our results
A straightforward interpretation of 'effective' is computable, in the sense that there is a Turing machine that decides, given each initial segment of the casino sequence:
(a) how much of the current capital to bet;
(b) which outcome to bet on.
These choices, in combination with the revelation of the outcome, then determine the capital at the beginning of the next betting stage. In §3 we show that in this case questions (1) and (2) have a positive answer.
Another formalisation of 'effective' which is very standard in algorithmic information theory (and used in the standard definition of algorithmic randomness) is 'computably enumerable'. When applied to betting strategies this gives a notion which is equivalent to infinite mixtures of strategies which are generated by a single Turing machine (see §2.1). In this case questions (1) and (2) have negative answers. In fact, we show that there are casino sequences X on which computably enumerable (i.e. infinite computable mixtures of) strategies generate infinite capital exponentially fast, in the weak sense that 4 lim sup
and M is the capital after the first n bets on X,
but no single-sided computably enumerable strategy succeeds. On the other hand, if there is a computably enumerable strategy such that lim sup n M(X ↾ n )/α n = ∞ for some α > √ 2 then there exists a single-sided computably enumerable strategy which succeeds on X, in the sense that lim n M(X ↾ n ) = ∞. We will see that these results can also be stated in terms of the effective Hausdorff dimension of the casino sequence.
We then consider computably enumerable strategies which are not necessarily monotonous, but where the predicate indicating which outcome receives the largest bet (i.e. which outcome the player actually bets on, if there is one) is decidable; let us call such strategies decidably-sided. By generalising our previous arguments we show that there is a casino sequence and a computably enumerable betting strategy M that strongly succeeds on it as before, in the sense of (3), but such that no decidably-sided computably enumerable strategy succeeds on it. This last result relates to a problem of Kastermans which was reported in [Downey, 2012] as well as in the monograph [Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010, §7.9] . The relationship between this problem and our results is discussed in §5.
Outline of the presentation
In §2.1 we introduce martingale functions as betting strategies and establish certain approximation properties of left-c.e. martingales that will be crucial in our arguments. We also demonstrate that left-c.e. martingales are exactly the uniform mixtures of computable martingales. In §2.3 we formalise the various notions of monotonous strategy which we shall be concerned with in this paper, as martingales with additional properties. In §2.4 we review the relationship between speed of success for martingales and Hausdorff dimension, which is crucial for the statement and proof of our main results in §3 and §4. We also include and prove Proposition 2.7, which shows that our main results are sharp. In §2.5 we show how to bet on a biased coin without knowing the bias, with a general fact about prediction functions that is used in the following sections.
In §3 we first describe a decomposition of computable martingales into two single-sided martingales, which provides the positive answer to questions (1) and (2) stated in the introductory discussion, for the case of computable strategies. We then give a detailed argument for the proof of Theorem 3.3 which gives a strong negative answer to these questions for the case of left-c.e. single-sided strategies. In §4 we modify the argument of the previous section and generalize the previous result to decidably-sided left-c.e. strategies.
Background, definitions, and basic results
In this section we shall mainly be concerned with giving the required background for our main results, although we shall also include some original results here. It will be convenient to use certain notions from algorithmic information theory and Kolmogorov complexity in our arguments. For general background in these areas we refer to [Li and Vitányi, 1997] , while [Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010] and [Nies, 2009] will be cited for specific facts or discussions that are relevant to our study.
Betting strategies as martingales
Betting strategies are formalized by martingales 5 which are used in order to express the capital after each betting stage and each casino outcome. Formally, a martingale is a function M : 2 <ω → R + with the property that, for all σ ∈ 2 <ω :
Probabilistically, such a function M : 2 <ω → R + can be seen as a martingale stochastic process (Y s ) relative to the underlying fair coin-tossing stochastic process (I s ), where I s is the outcome of the sth coin-toss which can be 0 or 1 with equal probability 1/2, so that:
(a) Y s is measurable in (i.e. determined by the outcome of) I i , i ≤ s;
Note that the definition of a martingale in (4) as a deterministic function relates to its probabilistic interpretation in the same way that a random variable can be seen as a deterministic function from a probability space to R.
If we view martingales as deterministic functions satisfying (4), then they provide a formalisation of a betting strategy on an infinite coin-tossing game: at position σ our capital is M(σ) and we bet
on i for i = 0, 1. Note that either b M (σ * 0) = b M (σ * 1) = 0, in which case no bet is placed for the next bit of σ, or for some i ∈ {0, 1} we have b M (σ * i) > 0, b M (σ * (1 − i)) < 0, meaning that the bet is on i at this stage. We say that M succeeds on X if
In order to consider realistic strategies it is natural to require that the martingales we consider are definable or have some effectivity properties, for example that they are programmable in a Turing machine. Beyond such computable martingales it is also useful to consider the left-c.e. (left computably enumerable) martingales which are martingales M such that M(σ) can be approximated by an increasing computable sequence of rationals, uniformly in σ.
Computable and left-c.e. martingales can also be used as a foundation of algorithmic information theory, see [Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010, §13.2] or [Bienvenu et al., 2009] . We can define an infinite binary sequence to be algorithmically random if no left-c.e. martingale M succeeds on it in the standard sense of (5) . It turns out that any left-c.e. martingale M can be transformed into a left-c.e. martingale N such that lim n N(X ↾ n ) = ∞ for each X such that (5) holds.
The betting strategies (or unpredictability) approach to algorithmic randomness is equivalent to the other two traditional approaches, namely the incompressibility approach (through Kolmogorov complexity) and the measure-theoretic approach (through statistical tests). So a real X is Martin-Löf random (i.e. roughly speaking, avoids all effective null sets) if and only if there exists some constant c for which ∀n K(X ↾ n ) > n− c, where K denotes the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity of X, if and only if no left-c.e. (super)martingale succeeds on X. The equivalence of the martingale approach with the other two is based on the Kolmogorov inequality which says that if M is a supermartingale then:
where λ denotes the empty string. If S covers the whole space then equality holds, giving a version of the familiar fairness condition described by the martingale property.
Universality of effective martingales and approximations
By [Downey et al., 2004] there exists no effective enumeration of all left-c.e. martingales. This is usually an inconvenience in arguments which involve diagonalisation against all left-c.e. martingales, and one of the reasons why it is sometimes convenient to work with supermartingales i.e. functions M : 2 <ω → R + with the property that 2M(σ) ≥ M(σ * 0)+ M(σ * 1). 6 It is not hard to see that there exists a uniform enumeration of all left-c.e. supermartingales, and this is the reason there exists a left-c.e. supermartingale M which is optimal, in the sense that any other left-c.e. supermartingale is O (M), i.e. multiplicatively dominated by M. On the other hand, by [Downey et al., 2004] there is no optimal left-c.e. martingale M, i.e. such that any other left-c.e. martingale is O (M). It is not hard to show that any left-c.e. supermartingale M can be transformed into a left-c.e. martingale N such that lim sup n N(X ↾ n ) = ∞ for any X on which M succeeds, i.e. such that (5) holds. Moreover these facts also hold for 'computable' in place of 'left-c.e.', meaning that we can often use martingales or supermartingales interchangeably.
Our arguments are specific to martingales, so we need to deal with the fact that no uniform enumeration of left-c.e. martingales, perhaps with certain additional properties, exists. Sometimes it is enough to have a universal left-c.e. martingale M, i.e. one such that (5) holds if and only if there exists a left-c.e. martingale N which succeeds on X. By [Schnorr, 1971a,b] there exists a universal left-c.e. martingale, although as we noted before, no optimal left-c.e. martingale exists. However it is not clear whether there exist universal strategies for the classes of monotonous strategies that we study in this article, which we formally introduce in §2.3. For this reason, the following lemma regarding approximations of martingales will be crucial in our arguments.
Lemma 2.1 (Approximation of left-c.e. martingales). Given a left-c.e. supermartingale M with monotone approximation (M s ) and an increasing computable sequence (t i ) with t i = 0, we can effectively obtain a computable monotone approximation (N s ) to a left-c.e. supermartingale N and a non-decreasing computable sequence (v i ) with v 0 = 0 such that for all s,
and moreover such that:
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that either M is the all zero function, or else M s (λ) < M s+1 (λ) for each s. The idea is to consider the increases of M(λ) and to try and distribute them in a martingale fashion to all strings σ ∈ 2 ≤t vs +1 , by waiting for a sufficiently large stage where the approximations M s (σ), σ ∈ 2 ≤t vs +1 are sufficiently close to their limits M(σ). Upon the arrival of such a stage, we may increase v s by 1, and start the next cycle of stages by considering a further increase of M(λ).
Formally, the enumeration of N will take place in cycles of stages. 
↑ for all σ λ, and declare s = 0 to be a cycle resolution stage. Inductively, at stage s + 1 we look for the least σ ∈ 2 ≤t vs +1 such that
take two values such that:
If for all σ ∈ 2 ≤t vs +1 we have
It follows inductively that between two resolution stages the values N s (σ) do not change, so that (b) holds. At the end of each resolution stage s we have 2N s (σ) = N s (σ * 0) + N s (σ * 1) for all σ ∈ 2 <t vs , and it follows that (7) holds for all s. Finally for (a), note that if M is not a martingale then there exists σ such that
. This means that some cycle of stages will never be completed, so lim i v i < ∞ and by the construction of N, we also have N(λ) < M(λ). Conversely, if M is a martingale then every cycle will be completed, and it follows from the construction that we have M = N. If M is the all zero function then it is clear that there will be infinitely many cycles, and that lim
for each s, and again it follows that there are infinitely many cycles and that lim i v i = ∞.
It turns out that left-c.e. martingales can also be viewed as computable mixtures of martingales.
Lemma 2.2 (Left-c.e. martingales as effective mixtures).
A martingale is left-c.e. if and only if it can be written as the sum of a uniformly computable sequence of martingales.
Proof. If (N i ) is a uniformly computable sequence of martingales and
is a left-c.e. martingale. For the converse, assume that M is a left-c.e. martingale. We define a family (N i ) of martingales as follows. Inductively assume that N i , i < k have been defined, they are martingales, and for all σ,
Without loss of generality we may also assume that
Since M is a martingale, this means that there exists some larger stage s such that:
Then we let N k (σ * i), i = {0, 1} be two non-negative rationals such that:
This concludes the inductive definition of N k and also verifies the property (8) for k + 1 in place of k.
Note that the totality of each N i is guaranteed by the fact that M is a martingale. It remains to show that for each σ:
From the definition of each N i (λ), it follows that (10) holds for σ = λ. Assuming (10) for σ, we show that it holds for σ * i, i ∈ {0, 1}. We have
so by (10) we have:
By (8) applied to σ * 0 and σ * 1 we get lim k S k (σ * i) = M(σ * i) for i ∈ {0, 1}, as required. This concludes the inductive proof that (10) holds.
By Lemma 2.2, left-c.e. martingales can be seen as effective mixtures of countably many computable strategies that are produced by a single machine, act independently of each other and use the same capital.
Monotonous strategies as martingales and supermartingales
We formally define strategies that bet in a monotonous fashion, in terms of (super)martingales.
We say that M is single-sided if it is either 0-sided or 1-sided.
The following concept will be useful throughout the paper.
Definition 2.4 (Prediction functions).
A prediction function f is a function from 2 <ω to {0, 1}. We say that i < |σ| is a correct f -guess with respect to σ if f (σ ↾ i ) = σ(i); otherwise we say that i is a false f -guess with respect to σ.
Given a prediction function f and n ∈ N we let f ↾ n denote the restriction of f to all strings of length less than n. A generalization of single-sided strategies is formalized as follows.
Definition 2.5 (Decidably-sided strategies). Given a prediction function f , a (super)martingale M is fsided if any bias on the outcomes is decided by f ; formally, if for all
decidably-sided if its favourable outcome is decidable, in the sense that it is f -sided for a (total) computable prediction function f .
So decidably-sided strategies can be seen as single-sided betting strategies modulo some effective renaming of 0s and 1s. Another restricted strategy that we discussed informally in question (2) is when the bets on 0s and the bets on 1s are based on separated capital pools, with any winnings being returned to them, and losses taken from them, in a disjoint fashion. These strategies are modelled by separable martingales which are martingales that can be written as the sum of a 0-sided and a 1-sided martingale.
It is clear that f -sided and separable martingales are closed under (countable, subject to convergence) addition and multiplication by a constant. In fact, many of the basic facts concerning left-c.e. martingales that we outlined in §2.1 also hold for the restricted martingales introduced above, by similar proofs.
If M is an f -sided martingale then there is an f -sided martingale N such that lim n N(X ↾ n ) = ∞ for all X on which M succeeds, in the sense of (5) . Moreover the same holds if we replace ' f -sided' with 'separable' or 'decidably-sided', or even qualify M, N as left-c.e. or computable (if f is also computable).
The proof is a simple adaptation of the standard argument, the so-called savings trick, (see [Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010, Proposition 6.3.8] ).
As we discussed in §2.1, algorithmic randomness can be defined with respect to a class of effective (super)martingales. So each of the restricted martingale notions that we have discussed, left-c.e. or computable, corresponds to a randomness notion. Separating these notions is often a matter of adapting existing methods on this topic, such as [Nies, 2009, Chapter 7] .
Theorem 2.6 (Partial computable strategies vs single-sided left-c.e. strategies). There exists X such that a 0-sided left-c.e. martingale succeeds on X and no partial computable supermartingale succeeds on X.
The proof of Theorem 2.6 is a straightforward adaptation of the arguments in [Nies, 2009, §7.4] and is thus left to the reader as an exercise. Our main results, presented in §3 and §4 can also be viewed as separations of randomness notions, but their proofs require novel arguments.
Speed of success and effective Hausdorff dimension
The martingale approach to algorithmic information theory was introduced by [Schnorr, 1971a,b] who also showed some interest in the rate of success of (super)martingales M, and in particular the classes
where h : N → N is a computable non-decreasing function. Later [Lutz, 2000 [Lutz, , 2003 showed that the Hausdorff dimension of a class of reals can be characterized by the exponential 'success rates' of left-c.e. supermartingales, and in that light defined the effective Hausdorff dimension dim(X) of a real X as the infimum of the s ∈ (0, 1) such that X ∈ S h (M) for some left-c.e. supermartingale M, where h(n) = 2 (1−s)n . Then [Mayordomo, 2002] showed that
where C and K denote the plain and prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity respectively. Note that reals with effective Hausdorff dimension 1/2 include partially predictable reals (with an imbalance of 0s and 1s) like Y ⊕ ∅ where Y is algorithmically random, as well as random-looking versions of the halting probability like U(σ)↓ 2 −2|σ| where U is a universal prefix-free machine, which was introduced in [Tadaki, 2002] . Martin-Löf random reals have effective dimension 1, but the converse does not hold. Moreover there are computably random reals of effective dimension 0. For more on this topic of algorithmic dimension we refer the reader to [Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010, Chapter 13] .
For the proof of Proposition 2.7 we need a characterization of dimension in terms of tests. Given s ∈ (0, 1), an s-test is a uniformly c.e. sequence (V i ) of sets of strings such that σ∈V k 2 −s|σ| < 2 −k for each k. Let us say that X is weakly s-random if it avoids all s-tests (V i ), in the sense that there are only finitely many i such that X has a prefix in V i . By [Tadaki, 2002] , X being weakly s-random is equivalent to the condition that ∃c ∀n K(X ↾ n ) > s · n − c. Then by (11) we have dim(X) = sup{s | X is weakly s-random}.
The following result complements our main theorems in §3 and §4.
Proposition 2.7. If dim(X) < 1/2 then there exists a single-sided left-c.e. martingale which succeeds on X.
Proof. We may assume that the limiting frequency of 0s in X is 1/2, otherwise (12) gives the required single-sided left-c.e. martingale. Given that dim(X) < 1/2, there exists a rational q < 1/2 and a q-test (V i ) such that X has a prefix in infinitely many V i . Given (V i ) we define a 0-sided left-c.e. martingale M such that M(X ↾ n ) → ∞ as n → ∞. For each i and each σ ∈ V i we define a martingale M i,σ , and then M is defined as the sum of all the M i,σ . For each i and each σ ∈ V i , we specify M i,σ as follows. We define M i,σ (λ) = 2 −q|σ| and then bet all capital on all the 0s of σ, while placing no bets on all other strings. Note that if σ has z σ many 0s then:
We claim that lim n M(X ↾ n ) = ∞. Let q ′ be a rational in (q, 1/2). Since the limiting frequency of 0s in X is 1/2, there exists some n 0 such that for each n > n 0 the number z X↾ n of 0s in X ↾ n is more than q ′ n, so 2 z X↾n −qn > 2 (q ′ −q)n . Given any constant c, let n 1 > n 0 be such that 2 (q ′ −q)n 1 > c. Let n 2 > n 1 be such that X has a prefix in V n 2 and all strings in V n 2 are of length at least n 1 . Then let σ be a prefix of X in V n 2 . Then by the definition of M we have M(X ↾ n ) ≥ 2 (q ′ −q)n 1 > c for all n ≥ n 2 , which concludes the proof that lim n M(X ↾ n ) = ∞.
Betting on a biased coin without knowing the bias
Given a casino sequence X with limiting frequency of 0s different than 1/2, there is a single-sided betting strategy that is successful on X. Moreover there is a separable martingale which succeeds on every such X, irrespective of whether the frequency is above or below 1/2, or even how much it differs from 1/2. Here we show a slightly more general version of these folklore facts, which will be needed in our main arguments.
The following lemma is a consequence of Hoeffding's inequality. For our purposes here it will be useful to give a proof in terms of betting strategies.
Lemma 2.8. Given q > 1/2, n ∈ ω and a prediction function f , the number of strings in 2 n for which the number of correct f -guesses is more than qn is at most r −n q · 2 n , where r q > 1 is a function of q. So the number of strings in 2 n for which the number of correct f -guesses is in the interval ((1 − q)n, qn) is at least 2 n · (1 − 2r −n q ).
Proof. Given f , let z σ denote the number of correct f -guesses with respect to σ, and let o σ be the number of false f -guesses with respect to σ. For each q > 1/2, consider the function d :
The same is true in the case that f (σ) = 1, so that d is a martingale, which bets
on the prediction of f at σ. For each σ let p σ = z σ /|σ|, so that 1 − p σ = o σ /|σ|. Suppose that p σ > q. Then
where the second inequality holds because the function x → 2q x (1 − q) 1−x is increasing 7 in (0, 1) when q > 1/2. Again by considering the derivatives, we can see that the function q →· (1 − q) 1−q is decreasing 7 The derivative of
in (0, 1/2), increasing in (1/2, 1) and it has a global minimum in (0, 1) at q = 1/2, at which point it takes the value 1/2. So if we let r q := 2· (1 − q) 1−q and recall that q > 1/2 we get r q > 1 and d(σ) ≥ r |σ| q for each σ with p σ > q. From Kolmogorov's inequality in then follows that, if t n is the number of strings σ ∈ 2 n with p σ > q, then t n · 2 −n < r −n q . So t n < r −n q · 2 n as required.
Lemma 2.8 says that for each total prediction function f , with high probability the number of correct fguesses along a binary string σ are concentrated around |σ|/2. In fact, there exists a separable computable martingale which succeeds on every stream X with the property that the proportion of correct f -guesses along X does not reach limit 1/2. For each q ∈ (1/2, 1) let T q (λ) = 1, and define T q (σ) = 2 |σ| · q z σ · (1 − q) o σ where z σ is the number of correct f -guesses with respect to σ and o σ is the number of false f -guesses with respect to σ. By the proof of Lemma 2.8, T q (σ) is a martingale and lim sup s T q (X ↾ n ) = ∞ for each X such that lim sup s z X↾ n /n > q. Similarly, T q (σ) is a martingale for each q < 1/2, and lim sup s T q (X ↾ n ) = ∞ for each X such that lim sup s z X↾ n /n < q. Let q i = 1/2 + 2 −i−1 and p i = 1/2 − 2 −i−1 for each i and define:
Then N is a computable martingale and by the properties of T q i , T p i , it succeeds on every X for which the proportion of correct f -guesses does not tend to 1/2. In the case that f is the constant zero function T q is 0-sided, which implies the following fact, where 'computably single-sided random' is a sequence where no computable single-sided (super)martingale succeeds.
A computably single-sided random has relative frequency of 0s tending to 1/2.
Hence weak s-randomness for s ∈ (0, 1) does not imply computable single-sided randomness. By Proposition 2.7, however, the left-c.e. version of single-sided randomness does imply weak 1/2-randomness.
Single-sided martingales
It turns out that if a computable martingale succeeds on some casino sequence X, then there exists a computable single-sided martingale which succeeds on X. This is a consequence of the following decomposition result.
Lemma 3.1 (Single-sided decomposition). Every martingale M is the product of a 0-sided martingale N and a 1-sided martingale T . Moreover N, T are computable from M.
Lemma 3.1 was also noticed independently by Frank Stephan. A direct consequence of Lemma 3.1 is the following.
Corollary 3.2. Given a computable martingale M, there exist a 0-sided martingale N 0 and a 1-sided martingale N 1 such that for each X on which M is successful, at least one of N 0 , N 1 is successful. We do not know, however, if there is universality in these restricted notions of martingales, and this is an additional hurdle for the proof of Theorem 3.3. In §3.2, §3.3, §3.4 and §3.5 we give the proof of Lemma 3.4 which is the main argument in this work. The presentation is given in a modular style, so that the template can be easily modified for the proof of Theorem 3.3, as well as its generalisation in §4.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Recall the discussion from §2.1 concerning
, which is positive if and only if M wins on the last digit of σ. We can write M in multiplicative form as:
If b M (σ * i) > 0 then we say that M bets on i at σ and if b M (σ * i) = 0 then M does not bet at σ. Conversely, every function defined by (13) such that |b M (σ * i)| ≤ M(σ) and b M (σ * 0) + b M (σ * 1) = 0 for each σ, is a martingale. For the proof of Lemma 3.1, suppose that we are given a martingale M as in (13). It suffices to define a 0-sided martingale N and a 1-sided martingale T such that for each σ we have M(σ) = N(σ)· T (σ). Given σ let n i,σ , i < n * σ be the sequence of positions (in order of magnitude) with n i,σ < |σ| − 1 such that M bets on 0 or does not bet, at σ ↾ n i,σ . Also let t j,σ , j < t * σ be the sequence of the remaining positions < |σ| − 1, i.e. the positions on which M bets on 1, at σ ↾ t j,σ . Then by (13) and the above definitions, we have
For any martingale S and any τ define:
Define N(λ) to be M(λ) if M bets on 0 at λ (i.e. n 0,σ = 0) and 1 otherwise. Similarly define T (λ) to be M(λ) if if M bets on 1 at λ (i.e. t 0,σ = 0) and 1 otherwise. Also for each non-empty σ define:
Then by the properties of b M we have b N (σ * 0) + b N (σ * 1) = 0 for each σ and |b N (σ * i)| ≤ N(σ) so N is a martingale. Moreover by its definition, it is a 0-sided martingale. Similarly T is a 1-sided martingale. Finally by the definition of N, T and (14) we have M(σ) = N(σ) · T (σ), which completes the proof.
Proof idea and preliminary facts for Lemma 3.4
We will construct the real X of Lemma 3.4 so as to extend a sequence of initial segments (σ n ), where each σ n is of length s n . Given a left-c.e. separable martingale M we will construct X of effective Hausdorff dimension 1/2 such that M(X ↾ n ) is bounded above. Without loss of generality we can assume that M(λ) < 2 −1 . In order to ensure the dimension requirement for X, it suffices to ensure that
for all n, where V is a prefix-free machine that we also construct, K V is the Kolmogorov complexity with respect to V, and (q n ) is a computable decreasing sequence of rationals tending to 1/2. Let us set q n = 1/2 + 1/(n + 2) andM(σ) = max n≤|σ| M(σ ↾ n ). We will ensure that for all n:
One way to think about this requirement is to try to ensure thatM(σ n ) −M(σ n−1 ) ≤ 2 −n−1 for all n. Supposing inductively that σ n−1 has been determined, the task of keepingM(σ n ) −M(σ n−1 ) small potentially involves changing the approximation to σ n a number of times, since M is a left-c.e. martingale. This instability of the final value of σ n is in conflict with (15).
The main idea for handling this conflict is that if we choose σ n from a collection of strings S n which have roughly similar number of 0s and 1s, then a single-sided strategy is limited to winning on around half of the available bits. With such a limitation on the components of M, the separability of M ensures that the growth potential of M is also limited, in a way that allows the satisfaction of (15).
The following basic lemma ensures that we can restrict our choice of strings in this way, without sacrificing much measure.
Lemma 3.5. For each ǫ ∈ (0, 1) it holds for all sufficiently large m that the number of strings in 2 m with the number of zeros (and hence, 1s) in
By Lemma 3.5, given any computable sequence (ǫ n ) of numbers in (0, 1/2) there exists an increasing computable sequence (k n ) such that for all increasing (s n ) with s n − s n−1 ≥ k n and each σ ∈ 2 s n :
There is a set S σ n+1 of extensions of σ of length s n+1 such that |S σ n+1 | ≥ (1−ǫ n )·2 s n+1 −s n and for each τ ∈ S σ n+1 the number of 0s (hence also the number of 1s) in the interval
The next concern, given the restriction to strings in S σ n n+1 , is to be able to choose an extension of σ n where capital does not increase substantially (note that without the restriction to S σ n+1 , we can always choose an extension where the capital does not increase at all). s n nth level of X S n generic strings of length s n (for the general result we use B n instead) k n minimum required size for s n − s s−1 , to ensure the existence of S n in (17) ǫ n appropriate threshold in the definition of S n , B n , set as 2 Table 1 : Parameters for the generic sets of strings Lemma 3.6. Given any σ, any ǫ > 0 and any set S of extensions of σ of some fixed length |σ| + n such that |S | ≥ (1 − ǫ) · 2 n , there exists at least one string τ ∈ S such that M(τ * ) ≤ M(σ)/(1 − ǫ) for all τ * with σ ⊆ τ * ⊆ τ.
Proof. Towards a contradiction suppose that there exists no such string in S , and for each τ ∈ S let τ * be the shortest initial segment extending σ for which M(τ * ) > M(σ)/(1 − ǫ). Then S * = {τ * : τ ∈ S } is a prefix-free set of strings. Since every element of S has an initial segment in S * it follows that:
which contradicts Kolmogorov's inequality relative to σ.
, so a small multiplicative amplification of the capital from σ to τ can be translated into a small additive increase in M(τ) − M(σ), as long as we keep M(σ) under a fixed bound.
It is not difficult to see how Lemma 3.6 can be applied. Once σ n−1 has been chosen, the lemma tells us directly that we will be able to choose σ n without increasing the capital of M by too much. Since M is a left-c.e. martingale, however, we may have to change our approximation to σ n a number of times. The point of the next lemma is to bound the number of times we will have to change our minds regarding the value of σ n , so long as our approximation to σ n−1 is not changing. We make use of the following consequence of Lemma 2.1, which gives us a canonical approximation to M.
Given a computable increasing sequence (s n ) and a left-c.e. martingale N, there exists a left-c.e. approximation (N s ) to N such that for each n > 0, each s > n − 1 and each σ ∈ 2 ≤s n we have
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that (s n ) is defined according to some sequence (ǫ n ) and (17), and let N, T be left-c.e. single-sided martingales with approximations as in (18). If M = N + T and M s = N s + T s , then for any σ ∈ 2 s n−1 , each τ σ with an extension in S n , and any stages t > s > n − 1 with M t (σ) − M s (σ) ≤ 2 −p , we have:
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that N is left-c.e. 0-sided and T is a 1-sided martingale. Between stages s and t there is at most 2 −p increase in
By the definition of S n , there are at most (1 + ǫ n )(s n − s n−1 )/2 many 0s on the bits of τ where σ is undefined, and the same is true of the 1s. Hence, since t > s > n − 1 and the enumerations (N i ), (T i ) of N, T have the property of (18):
By adding these two, using the fact that
We set ǫ n = 2 −n−3 , thus also fixing the sequence (k n ), which was defined in terms of (ǫ n ) in the discussion above (17). It remains to define (s n ), thus also fixing the sets (S σ n ).
Fixing the parameters for Lemma 3.4
Suppose that our choice of σ n−1 has settled, but that now we are forced to choose a new value of σ n , because the capital on some initial segment has increased by too much. What does Lemma 3.7 tell us about the increase in capital, 2 −p n say, that must have seen at σ n−1 in order for this to occur? A bound for p n gives a corresponding bound on the number of times that σ n will have to be chosen: after σ n−1 has settled the approximation to the next initial segment σ n can change at most 2 p n many times. Overall, σ n can then change at most 2 i<n p i · 2 p n many times, and in order to satisfy (15), at each of these changes we need to enumerate to the machine V a description of length q n · s n . In order to keep the weight of these requests bounded, we will aim at keeping the total weight of the requests corresponding to σ n bounded above by 2 −n , for which it is sufficient that:
By the bound given in Lemma 3.7 in order for the growth ofM(σ n ) at each length s n to be bounded above by 2 −n−1 , we need to set:
By Lemma 3.7 it then follows that any growth of M(τ) by at least 2 −n−2 for some τ with σ n−1 ⊆ τ ⊆ σ n , requires an increase of at least 2 −p n in M(σ n−1 ). Then p n − q n s n = n + 2 + s n · 1+ǫ n 2 − q n . Note that (1 + ǫ n )/2 < q n by the definitions of q n , ǫ n . So (19) reduces to:
So it suffices to set:
Construction for Lemma 3.4
Let σ 0 [s] = λ for all s and for each n > 0 let S n denote the union of all S σ n for all σ of length s n−1 . At stage s + 1 the segment σ n requires attention if n > 0 and one of the following holds:
At stage s + 1 pick the least n ≤ s such that σ n requires attention. If σ n [s] ↑, define it to be the leftmost extension σ of σ n−1 [s] in S n such that:
SinceM(σ n−1 ) < 1 and ǫ n /(1 − ǫ n ) < 2 −n−2 , condition (22) implieŝ
If, on the other hand,
In any case, let k ≤ s the least (if such exists) such that
3.5 Verification of the construction for Lemma 3.4
By Lemma 3.6 we can always find a string σ as required in (22) of the construction. In this sense, the construction of (σ n [s]) is well-defined. In any interval of stages where σ n−1 remains defined, successive values of σ n are lexicographically increasing. It follows that each σ n [t] converges to a final value σ n such that σ n ≺ σ n+1 . The real X determined by the initial segments σ n is thus left-c.e. and since (22) implies (23), we have M(X ↾ n ) < 1 for all n.
It remains to show that the weight of V is bounded above by 1. Suppose that σ n gets (re)defined at stage s + 1 and at stage t > s + 1 it becomes undefined, while
Since σ n becomes undefined at stage t, we haveM t (σ n [s + 1]) > 2 −1 + i<n 2 −i−2 . By Lemma 3.7 and (20) 
During an interval of stages where σ n−1 remains defined, σ n can take at most 2 p n values.
It follows that the weight of the V-descriptions that we enumerate for strings of length s n is at most:
By the definition of s n in (21) and (19) this weight is bounded above by 2 −n . So the total weight of the descriptions that are enumerated into V is at most 1.
3.6 Adaptation of the main argument for Theorem 3.3
The proof of Lemma 3.4 clearly applies to the more general case where M is any finite sum of left-c.e. single-sided martingales. In order to generalise the argument for the proof of Theorem 3.3, it suffices to deal with the case where M is a countable sum of a list of (super)martingales which includes all single-sided left-c.e. martingales, at least up to multiplicative factors. 8
In order to construct M, first note that Lemma 2.1 also holds restricted to 0-sided or 1-sided supermartingales, in which case the transformed supermartingale N is also 0-sided or 1-sided respectively. Given any computable increasing ( We may also assume without loss of generality 10 that for all i:
for all σ ∈ 2 ≤s i and all t ∈ N.
Note that the addition of condition (24) to our list (N i ) means that certain single-sided left-c.e. martingales may not be part of our list, i.e. (a) fails, although for each such excluded N there must be some N ′ in the list which is the same as N, modulo finitely many differences and proportional bets from some point on. This is sufficient for our purposes, so we may replace (a) above with:
(a) * If N is a single-sided left-c.e. martingale then there exists k such that
Given (N i ) with the properties (a) * , (b), (c) and (24) we define for each s,
where n σ is such that σ ∈ 2 s nσ .
Note that by (24) we have M s (λ) < ∞ for all s, so the limit M of (M s ) is a left-c.e. supermartingale. Also note that, by (24) we have,
We now need a version of Lemma 3.7 that applies to M.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that (s n ) is defined according to some sequence (ǫ n ) and (17), and let M be defined by (25) and the list (N i [s]) satisfying (a) * , (b), (c) and (24), where v s (i) is the growth function corresponding to N i . Then for any σ ∈ 2 s n−1 , each τ ⊇ σ with an extension in S n , and any stages t > s > n − 1 with
unless there exists some i ≤ n such that v s (i) ≤ n − 1 and v t (i) ≥ n.
9 Note that here, in contrast to the statement of Lemma 2.1, the subscript on N i denotes its index, while the stage of approximation is denoted by the suffix [s] .
10 This is a standard trick, whereby one modifies the original list (N n ) of strategies so that no bets are placed up to length s n , and such that after that the bets are proportional to the bets ofN n , based on the ratioN n (σ)/N n (σ ↾ sn ), see [Nies, 2009, Fact 7.4.3] . ThenN n succeeds on X if and only if N n does.
11 Note that the multiplicative constants in O (N k (τ)) may be different for each N (and each corresponding k).
Proof. Given the parameters and hypotheses of the lemma it suffices to show the following:
, so according to the hypothesis of the lemma,
By the definition of S n , there are at most (1 + ǫ n )(s n − s n−1 )/2 many 0s on the bits of τ where σ is undefined, and the same is true of the 1s. Hence, if i ≤ n and v s (i) ≥ n, by property (c) of the enumeration N i and the fact that t > s > n − 1 we have
On the other hand if i ≤ n and v s (i) ≤ n−1, by the hypothesis of (27) we have v t (i) ≤ n−1 and by the second clause of property (c) of the enumeration of N i we have N i (τ)[t] = 0. Hence by adding up the inequalities (29) for the i ≤ n such that v s (i) ≥ n along with (28) we get (27) as required.
Before producing a construction of the required X of Theorem 3.3 in the style of §3.4, we need to set the parameters; see Table 1 . All of the parameters, including p n , k n , q n , ǫ n , will remain the same except for the definition of (s n ). Going through the calculations of §3.3, we now need to use Lemma 3.8 in place of Lemma 3.7. This, in particular, means that in (19) which determines values for s n allowing the satisfaction of (15), we now need to account for the fact that the event in the last line of Lemma 3.8 might occur. Since the markers v i (s) move monotonically, however, such a disruption can happen at most n times. Then inductively arguing as before, (19) becomes
Then (21) becomes
3.7 Construction and verification for Theorem 3.3
The construction of X for Theorem 3.3 is identical to the construction of §3.4 except that:
is the supermartingale approximation that we defined in §3.6;
• in place of M we use M * (similarlyM is replaced byM * ).
For the verification, the construction of (σ n [s]) is well-defined just as before. In the same way, each σ n [t] converges to a final value σ n , the real X determined by the initial segments σ n is l.c.e., and since (22) implies (23) (withM is replaced byM * ), we have M * (X ↾ n ) < 1 for all n. Then by (26) we get that M(X ↾ n ) < 2 for all n. Given this upper bound and the choice of (N i ) in §3.6, we can conclude that every single-sided left-c.e. martingale is bounded on X.
It remains to show that the weight of V is bounded above by 1. Suppose that σ n gets (re)defined at stage s + 1 and at stage t > s + 1 it becomes undefined, while Lemma 3.8 and (20) it follows that at least one of the following events must have occurred:
We have shown that during an interval of stages where σ n−1 remains defined, σ n can take at most 2 p n + n values. It follows that the weight of the V-descriptions that we enumerate for strings of length s n is at most 2 −s n q n · 2 i≤n p i · n 2 and by the definition of s n in (31) and (30) this weight is bounded above by 2 −n . So the total weight of the descriptions that are enumerated into V is at most 1.
Generalization to decidably-sided strategies
Recall the notion of decidably-sided strategies from §2.3. In this section we adapt the ideas of §3 in order to prove an analogue of Theorem 3.3 for these more general classes of strategies. The only additional feature in this argument is due to the fact that we need to deal with all (total) computable prediction functions, and there is no universal enumeration of these. As a result, (a) instead of a single computable list (S n ) of generic sets, we need to deal with intersections (B n ) of such families, corresponding to the various decidably-sided martingales in a list;
(b) the various families (S n ) are not uniformly computable as in §3, and the same is true of the intersections (B n ) that we need to define.
For (a) we generalize the generic sets of §3.2 in order to obtain the require intersections (B n ) that will limit the growth potential of the different appropriate martingales in our list, and hence the growth potential of the mixture M, which will be defined roughly as we did in §3.6, with some extra amendments. For (b), although (B n ) will not be uniformly computable, it will have sufficiently low complexity that a version of the argument of §3 works in the more general case of Theorem 4.1.
The family (B n ) that we need to define is based on the following facts, the first of which is an analogue of Lemma 3.5 and a consequence of Lemma 2.8. The following fact concerns the intersections of generic families for various prediction functions. In the following ǫ i ∈ (0, 1) and k i , s i ∈ N.
Lemma 4.3. Given any computable sequence (ǫ n ) there exists a computable sequence (k n ) such that for all (s n ) with s n − s n−1 > k n and any family ( f i ) of prediction functions there exists (B n ) such that B n ⊆ 2 s n and:
(1) For each σ ∈ 2 s n−1 there are at least (1 − ǫ n ) · 2 s n −s n−1 many extensions of σ in B n , and;
(2) For each i ≤ n such that f i is total, and each τ ∈ B n , the number of bits in [s n−1 , s n ) where f i guesses correctly with respect to τ are at most (1 + ǫ n ) · (s n − s n−1 )/2. (i) M * (σ n−1 ) grows more than 2 −p n ;
(ii) some v s (i), i ≤ n moves;
(iii) the approximation to B n changes;
where the first two cases are as in §3.6 and the third is particular to the present argument. Due to the choice of (N i [s], f i [s], v s (i)) and (32), however, the third case is subsumed in the second. So the calculation established in (30) continues to be justified, as does the definition of (s i ) in (31).
Construction and verification for Theorem 4.1
The construction is identical to the construction of §3.7, except that the existing parameters have been redefined according to §4.1, and moreover at stage s + 1 instead of S n we use B n [s].
For the verification, just as in §3.7 we get that M * (X ↾ n ) < 1 and M * (X ↾ n ) < 2 for all n. Given this upper bound and the choice of (N i , f i ) in §4.1, we can conclude that every decidably-sided left-c.e. martingale is bounded above along X.
It remains to show that the weight of V is bounded above by 1. Considering an interval of stages where σ n−1 remains defined, recall the cases (i)-(iii) discussed in §4.1 for the event that there is a change in the approximation to σ n . By this analysis, based on (32) and Lemma 4.4, it follows that
During an interval of stages where σ n−1 remains defined, σ n can take at most 2 p n + n values.
It follows that the weight of the V-descriptions that we enumerate for strings of length s n is at most 2 −s n q n · 2 i≤n p i · n 2 and by the definition of s n in (31) and (30) this weight is bounded above by 2 −n . So the total weight of the descriptions that are enumerated into V is at most 1.
Conclusion and some questions
We have studied the strength of monotonous strategies, which bet constantly on the same outcome (singlesided martingales) or bet in a predetermined way (decidably-sided martingales). In the case of computable strategies we have seen that they are as strong as the unrestricted strategies, while in the case of computable mixtures of strategies (left-c.e. martingales) they are significantly weaker. On the other hand, for casino sequences of effective Hausdorff dimension less than 1/2, successful left-c.e. strategies can be replaced by successful left-c.e. single-sided strategies.
Limitations of our methods and a problem of Kastermans
A close inspection of our main arguments in §3 and §4 shows that our methods have two limitations:
(a) They only apply to martingale strategies, as opposed to supermartingales;
